Trump's coalition of the weak

The American Bar Association's Task Force for American Democracy recently released its analysis outlining current threats to our democracy and reminding lawyers of our unique position and obligations to protect our democracy. At the same time, political pundits have been analyzing former President Donald Trump's selection of Senator J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential running mate and positing that the selection was driven by Trump's desire to have a running mate who "looked the part," someone with whom he had personal chemistry, and most importantly, according to the pundits, someone who passed Trump's multiple loyalty tests which included acceptance of Trump's fictional account of the 2020 Election and a pre-baked agreement to challenge the upcoming election if it is not "free and fair."

Along with a buzzer-beating assist by way of a lobbying campaign from Silicon Valley royalty including Elon Musk and Peter Theil, Senator Vance ostensibly got the nod because he passed each of these tests. Senator Vance also passed an unspoken test for Trump - he has no independent political power base outside of Trump. Senator Vance is a faint moon whose sole source of power is the reflection of Trump's sunlight. Trump's selection of Senator Vance is additional evidence that Trump has no intention of building a "team of rivals" as President Lincoln once did, but rather, to use the phrase developed by Professor Victor C. Shih of the UC San Diego School of Public Policy and Strategy while analyzing authoritarian leaders in China, he will build a "coalition of the weak." Trump will undoubtedly continue to surround himself with weak governing partners beyond his Vice-President if he is elected President so that no one will be in a position to challenge his rule.

As Professor Shih argues in his book "Coalitions of the Weak: Elite Politics in China from Mao's Stratagem to the Rise of Xi" (Cambridge, 2022), establishing authoritarian rule requires the appointment of the weak to positions of power irrespective of loyalty. Many analysts wrongly assume that the path to total control is paved by surrounding oneself with loyalists. Loyalty can change in an instant, weakness cannot. Professor Shih writes: "if an official had a past history of loyalty but also a sizable power base as a result of being a party veteran, he was a greater threat to the dictator than an official without a past history of loyalty and a weak network." (Coalitions of the Weak, Shih, pg. 13).

Focusing on Trump's statements about his selection criteria misses the mark. Trump will build a team of weak governing partners who have little or no political standing or power of their own so that he can dominate the Executive Branch, including the Justice Department, completely. A leader who desires absolute control "faces a trade-off between having experienced lieutenants, which favored institutional development and crisis management, and having security from internal challenges to their power." (Ibid, pg. 3). Trump's first presidency was a warm-up, a second Trump administration would certainly offer a more refined approach to the strategy. There will be no Mike Pence mistakes this time around.

Professor Shih's empirical study on Chinese authoritarian rule offers three important insights into the harms a country would face from a leader pursuing a coalition of the weak strategy.

First, as mentioned above, a coalition of the weak strategy would significantly harm a nation in a time of crisis with weak and inexperienced people holding positions where institutional knowledge, networks, and personal political capital can make all the difference. 

Second, policy making becomes dependent on the whims and personal preferences of the leader. As Shih notes, "full adoption of the coalition of the weak strategy led to the abolition or neglect of institutional channels for policy discussion and making, replaced by personal audiences with the dictator." (Ibid, pg. 5) Accounts from Trump's first presidential administration are replete with stories of his disdain for policy making norms and procedures. 

Finally, a warning that crosses all political divides in our nation. Shih analyzed Mao's final years: "Mao's main concern late in his life was the maintenance of absolute power in the face of declining health rather than prolonging his ideological legacy." (Ibid, 6) If Trump follows the pattern of others utilizing a "coalition of the weak" strategy we should all expect that he will spend zero energy ensuring conservative values and policies last beyond his presidency as many of his most ardent supporters would surely hope for, but rather he will focus his time and the efforts of his coalition of the weak on maintaining his power.

Although Chinese political history and institutions are different from our own, Shih's book proves once again the value of studies in comparative politics. Political analysts are wasting their ink writing about Trump's stated selection criteria. We must keep our eyes focused on the dangers to our democracy that emanate from his true litmus test for appointees - their weakness.